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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

AIDEN STOCKMAN; NICOLAS
 TALBOTT; TAMASYN REEVES;
 JAQUICE TATE; JOHN DOES 1-2;
 JANE DOE; and EQUALITY
 CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.

Defendants.

CASE NO. 5:17-CV-01799-JGB-KK

**DECLARATION OF GEORGE
 RICHARD BROWN, MD, DFAPA
 IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
 JOINT OPPOSITION TO
 MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE
 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.
Defendants.

1 1. I, George R. Brown, have been retained by counsel for Plaintiffs as an
2 expert in connection with the above-captioned litigation.

3 2. My professional background and qualifications are set forth in my
4 previous declaration dated October 2, 2017. *See* Dkt. No. 27. A copy of that
5 declaration is attached as Exhibit A.

6 3. The purpose of this supplemental declaration is to offer my expert
7 opinion on the “Department of Defense Report and Recommendations of Military
8 Service By Transgender Persons,” which I refer to in this declaration as the
9 “Implementation Report.” A copy of the Implementation Report is attached as
10 Exhibit B.

11 4. I have knowledge of the matters stated in this declaration and have
12 collected and cite to relevant literature concerning the issues that arise in this
13 litigation.

14 5. As noted in my previous declaration, I am being compensated at an
15 hourly rate for actual time devoted, at the rate of \$400 per hour for work that does
16 not involve depositions or court testimony (e.g., review of materials, emails,
17 preparing reports); \$500 per hour for depositions (there is a half-day fee for
18 depositions); \$600 per hour for in-court testimony; and \$4000 per full day spent
19 out of the office for depositions and \$4800 per full day out of the office for trial
20 testimony. Travels days necessary for work are billed at half the “work day” rate
21 plus expenses. My compensation does not depend on the outcome of this
22 litigation, the opinions I express, or the testimony I provide.

23 **THE IMPLEMENTATION REPORT REJECTS THE OVERWHELMING**
24 **MEDICAL CONSENSUS REGARDING TRANSGENDER IDENTITY AND**
25 **TREATMENT FOR GENDER DYSPHORIA**

26 6. Although the Implementation Report refers to a study conducted by a
27 “Panel of Experts,” the referenced panel does not appear to have included any
28 experts in treating gender dysphoria or any medical experts at all. The

1 Implementation Report indicates that the panel consulted with such experts, but the
2 Implementation Report appears to have consistently disregarded what those experts
3 say. *See* Exhibit B, Implementation Report at 17.

4 7. As a result, the Implementation Report relies on notions of gender
5 dysphoria and transgender identity that have no basis in fact, science, or medicine
6 and that have been rejected by the mainstream medical community.

7 8. In my previous declaration, I explained that arguments that the mental
8 health of transgender persons could justify prohibiting such individuals from
9 serving in the military are wholly unfounded and unsupported in medical science.
10 *See* Exhibit A, October 2, 2017 Brown Decl. ¶¶ 72-76. Being transgender—and
11 living in accordance with one’s gender identity—is not a mental defect or disorder.
12 To the extent the misalignment between gender identity and assigned birth sex
13 creates clinically significant distress (gender dysphoria), that distress is curable
14 through appropriate medical care that allows the individual to live consistently
15 with their gender identity.

16 9. Only a subset of transgender people have gender dysphoria. If a
17 transgender person is able to live in accordance with their gender identity from an
18 early age, they may never develop gender dysphoria as an adult. If a transgender
19 person develops gender dysphoria, they can receive appropriate transition-related
20 care that resolves the clinically significant distress. For transgender people who
21 have resolved symptoms of gender dysphoria, the American Psychiatric
22 Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2013)
23 (“DSM-5”) provides a separate “post-transition” diagnostic subtype to reflect that
24 the gender dysphoria is in remission and that the person may only need a
25 maintenance dose of cross-sex hormones.

26 10. The Implementation Report turns this understanding on its head by
27 requiring transgender people to live in accordance with the sex assigned to them at
28 birth. The Implementation Report conceives of a transgender person without

1 gender dysphoria as someone who comfortably lives and functions according to the
2 sex assigned to them at birth without suffering any distress from the incongruence
3 with their gender identity. That hypothetical person is likely not someone who is
4 transgender.

5 11. The Implementation Report directly contradicts the medical consensus
6 about the nature of gender dysphoria by treating every transgender person who
7 lives according to the person's gender as having a disabling mental health
8 condition even when the person no longer experiences gender dysphoria. The
9 medical community has definitively rejected that view. In response to the
10 Implementation Report, the American Psychological Association stated that it "is
11 alarmed by the administration's misuse of psychological science to stigmatize
12 transgender Americans and justify limiting their ability to serve in uniform and
13 access medically necessary health care." *See* Exhibit C, APA Statement Regarding
14 Transgender Individuals Serving in Military. The American Medical Association
15 released a similar statement reaffirming that "there is no medically valid reason—
16 including a diagnosis of gender dysphoria—to exclude transgender individuals
17 from military service" and expressing concern that the Implementation Report
18 "mischaracterized and rejected the wide body of peer-reviewed research on the
19 effectiveness of transgender medical care." *See* Exhibit D, AMA Letter to
20 Secretary James Mattis. The American Psychiatric Association also released a
21 statement denouncing the Implementation Report and reiterating that
22 "[t]ransgender people do not have a mental disorder; thus, they suffer no
23 impairment whatsoever in their judgment or ability to work." *See* Exhibit E, APA
24 Statement.

25 12. Decades of research have demonstrated that attempting to treat gender
26 dysphoria by forcing transgender people to live in accordance with their sex
27 assigned at birth—to "convert" them out of being transgender—is ineffective,
28

1 unethical, and dangerous. The mainstream medical community overwhelmingly
2 condemns this “conversion therapy.”

3 13. The Implementation Report appears to dispute the consensus of the
4 mainstream medical community that gender dysphoria is amenable to treatment
5 through social and medical transition. As noted in my previous declaration, the
6 American Medical Association, the Endocrine Society, the American Psychiatric
7 Association, and the American Psychological Association all agree that medical
8 treatment for gender dysphoria is medically necessary and effective. *See* American
9 Medical Association, Resolution 122 (A-08) (2008); American Psychiatric
10 Association, Position Statement on Discrimination Against Transgender & Gender
11 Variant Individuals (2012); Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons: An
12 Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline (2017); American Psychological
13 Association Policy Statement on Transgender, Gender Identity and Gender
14 Expression Nondiscrimination (2009). *See* Exhibit A, October 2, 2017 Brown
15 Decl. ¶ 34.

16 14. Sixty years of clinical experience and data have demonstrated the
17 efficacy of treatment for the distress resulting from gender dysphoria (*see*, for
18 example, the recently published multi-country, long-term follow up study: Tim C.
19 van de Grift et al., *Effects of Medical Interventions on Gender Dysphoria and Body*
20 *Image: A Follow-Up Study*, 79 *Psychosomatic Med.* 815 (Sept. 2017)). The
21 Implementation Report asserts that this evidence is unreliable because there are no
22 “double-blind” scientific studies regarding the efficacy of surgical care for gender
23 dysphoria. But medical standards of care are not determined solely by double-
24 blind studies, especially in the context of surgery. Double-blind studies with
25 “sham” surgeries are often impossible or unethical to conduct.

26 14. If the military limited all medical care to surgical procedures
27 supported by prospective, controlled, double-blind studies, then only a very few
28 medical conditions would ever be treated. For example, one of the most common

1 surgical procedures performed in the United States is a tonsillectomy, with over
2 530,000 cases completed a year, using multiple, competing surgical techniques.
3 However, a review of the evidence base for this very common procedure, including
4 when to apply it and the best surgical techniques to utilize, is not supported by
5 “double blind” controlled studies in spite of the common use of this treatment over
6 centuries. *See* Reginald F. Baugh et al., *Clinical Practice Guideline:
7 Tonsillectomy in Children*, 144 *Otolaryngology–Head and Neck Surgery* S1
8 (2011)). Baugh and coauthors noted: “While there is a body of literature from
9 which the guidelines were drawn, significant gaps remain in knowledge about
10 preoperative, intraoperative, and postoperative care in children who undergo
11 tonsillectomy.” *Id.* at S22.

12 15. Similarly, acute appendicitis is one of the most common causes of
13 acute abdominal pain in the United States. However, it remains unclear whether
14 the common approach of appendectomy is superior to nonsurgical treatment with
15 antibiotics in many patients. A recent Cochrane review was inconclusive: “We
16 could not conclude whether antibiotic treatment is or is not inferior to
17 appendectomy. Because of the low to moderate quality of the trials, appendectomy
18 remains the standard treatment for acute appendicitis.” *See* Ingrid M. H.A. Wilms
19 et al., *Appendectomy Versus Antibiotic Treatment for Acute Appendicitis*, *Cochrane
20 Database of Systematic Rev.* (2011). In other words, the prevailing standard of
21 care, in spite of the “low quality” of evidence in support of surgery over a
22 nonsurgical alternative, remains the accepted standard.

23 16. By insisting that treatment for gender dysphoria—unlike treatment for
24 virtually every other medical condition—be supported by “double blind” studies,
25 the Implementation Report holds the robust medical consensus surrounding
26 treatment for gender dysphoria to an impossible standard—and a standard that few
27 if any medical conditions are required to meet.

28

1 17. The Implementation Report also mischaracterizes a recent decision by
2 the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Center for Medicare and
3 Medicaid Services (“CMS”). *See* Exhibit B, Implementation Report at 24–26. In
4 2014, an impartial adjudicative board in the Department of Health & Human
5 Services concluded, based on decades of studies, that surgical care to treat gender
6 dysphoria is safe, effective, and not experimental. *See* Exhibit F, NCD 140.3,
7 Transsexual Surgery. The decision specifically noted that, regardless of whether
8 the studies were randomized double-blind trials, there was sufficient evidence to
9 prove “a consensus among researchers and mainstream medical organizations that
10 transsexual surgery is an effective, safe and medically necessary treatment for
11 [gender dysphoria].” *Id.* at 20. Ever since the adjudicative board’s decision,
12 Medicare has provided coverage for transition-related surgery based on patients’
13 individual needs.

14 18. In the document referenced by the Implementation Report, CMS
15 decided to continue covering surgery based on patients’ individual needs and
16 refrain from issuing national standards regarding how to determine medical
17 necessity in individualized cases. *See* Exhibit G, CMS Report. The
18 Implementation Report incorrectly states that CMS “found insufficient scientific
19 evidence to conclude that such surgeries improve health outcomes for persons with
20 gender dysphoria.” Exhibit B, Implementation Report at 24 n.82. In fact, the
21 decision specifically clarified that “GRS [gender reassignment surgery] may be a
22 reasonable and necessary service for certain beneficiaries with gender dysphoria,”
23 but “[t]he current scientific information is not complete for CMS to make a
24 [national coverage determination] that identifies *the precise patient population* for
25 whom the service would be reasonable and necessary.” Exhibit G, CMS Report at
26 54 (emphasis added). In particular, CMS expressed concern that the Medicare
27 population includes “older adults [who] may respond to health care treatments
28 differently than younger adults.” *Id.* at 57. These differences can be due to, for

1 example, multiple health conditions or co-morbidities, longer duration needed for
2 healing, metabolic variances, and impact of reduced mobility.” *Id.* The CMS
3 memorandum concluded that the appropriateness of surgical care for this
4 population should be determined on an individualized basis. Indeed, most medical
5 and surgical care provided to patients should be individualized, taking into account
6 each patient’s unique clinical circumstances.

7 **INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE UNDERGONE GENDER TRANSITION**
8 **ARE MEDICALLY FIT TO ENLIST**

9 19. To justify prohibiting transgender people from serving even if they
10 have resolved the distress associated with gender dysphoria, the Implementation
11 Report attempts to use a transgender person’s history of gender dysphoria as a
12 proxy for *other* mental health conditions such as anxiety, depression, and suicidal
13 behavior.

14 20. Statistically, transgender people as a group are at greater risk of
15 experiencing those conditions as a result of the stressors inherent in being
16 prevented from transitioning or obtaining medical care throughout all, or much, of
17 their lives. Some studies have documented that these health disparities can persist
18 even after transition-related treatment because of the continuing effects of
19 discrimination and the reality that gender dysphoria-specific treatments are not
20 panaceas for all problems that a person may experience in their life (nor were these
21 treatments designed to be). *See, e.g.,* Ex B, Implementation Report at 25 (citing
22 Cecilia Dhejne et al., *Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing*
23 *Sex Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden*, 6 PloS One, 6 (2011)). But
24 there is no evidence to support the notion that every individual transgender person
25 is at risk of developing one of these conditions, particularly for those who have
26 been treated early in their lives, as opposed to those who never received treatment
27 or who may have come to treatment much later in life, such as the transgender
28 veterans studied by my research group and cited in the Implementation Report at

1 21 n.60 (citing George R. Brown & Kenneth T. Jones, *Mental Health and Medical*
 2 *Health Disparities in 5135 Transgender Veterans Receiving Healthcare in the*
 3 *Veterans Health Administration: A Case-Control Study*, 3 *LGBT Health* 128
 4 (2016)).

5 21. Under the Open Service policy, all prospective military service
 6 members must undergo a rigorous examination to identify any pre-existing mental
 7 health diagnoses that would preclude enlistment. There is no reason to use a
 8 person's transgender status as a proxy for depression, anxiety, or suicidal ideation
 9 because the military directly screens for those conditions. Anyone with a history
 10 of suicidal behavior—whether transgender or not—is categorically barred from
 11 enlisting. *See* DODI 6130.03, Enclosure 4 § 29(n).¹ Anyone with a history of
 12 anxiety or depression—whether transgender or not—is barred from enlisting
 13 unless, *inter alia*, they have been stable and without medical treatment for 24
 14 consecutive months or 36 consecutive months respectively. *See id.* §§ 29(f), (p).
 15 As a result, although transgender people as a group may be more likely to have
 16 *other* mental health conditions, any transgender individual who actually has one of
 17 those conditions is already screened out without a need for a categorical ban.

18 22. There is no medical basis for using a transgender person's history of
 19 gender dysphoria as a proxy for other medical conditions that the person does not
 20 actually have. This approach is akin to assuming non-transgender female
 21 applicants are, or should be considered, clinically depressed, as it is well known
 22 that depressive disorders are about twice as common in non-transgender females
 23 than in non-transgender males. *See* Paul R. Albert, *Why Is Depression More*
 24 *Prevalent in Women?* 40 *J. of Psychiatry & Neuroscience* 219-21 (2015). If a
 25 transgender individual who seeks to enlist in the military has already transitioned,
 26

27 ¹ On March 30, 2018, DOD issued new regulations, which will go into effect
 28 on May 6, 2018. The U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command has not yet
 issued guidance applying the new regulations.

1 no longer experiences gender dysphoria, and has been screened for other mental
2 health conditions (including depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation) there is no
3 reason to conclude that individual is at elevated risk of developing one of these
4 comorbidities in the future.

5 23. The Implementation Report distorts my own work by citing a recent
6 study in which I documented that some transgender veterans who have received
7 treatment after years of living in the shadows continue to have health disparities
8 even after their gender dysphoria is resolved through treatment. *See* Exhibit B,
9 Implementation Report at 21 n.60. The veterans in my study were untreated
10 veterans for a long period of time and survived—but did not thrive—while living
11 an inauthentic life in the shadows on active duty. Many of the transgender
12 veterans included in this large study had *never* received treatment for gender
13 dysphoria. Clearly, the population group of transgender individuals in that study is
14 not comparable to the population group of people who have already received
15 medical care, resolved their gender dysphoria, and are coming to the military
16 openly stating they are transgender.

17 24. The Implementation Report also states that data regarding existing
18 service members has called into question assumptions about the mental health of
19 transgender service members. *See* Exhibit B, Implementation Report 21. I have
20 reviewed USDOE 2633-2664, which appears to be a slide-show presentation of the
21 data on which the Implementation Report relies. *See* Exhibit H, USDOE 2633-
22 2664 (produced by Defendants as USDOE 2633-2664 (AF_00007405-7436) and
23 filed as Docket No. 139-27 in the related matter of *Stone, et al. v. Trump, et al.*,
24 No. 17-CV-02459-MJG (D. Md.)). It should be noted that my career as an
25 academic research psychiatrist, including conducting extensive research within the
26 Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs for many years,
27 enables me to critically assess research design, methodology, and outcomes.

28

1 25. As an initial matter, none of the data relates to service members who
2 have completed transition and are enlisting for the first time—the group of people
3 who meet the Open Service standards and began the process of enlisting on or after
4 January 1, 2018. The data are exclusively from service members who were
5 diagnosed with gender dysphoria while already serving, in some cases well before
6 any guidance was provided by DOD for treatment. Again, this means that the data
7 reflects a group of people who were serving in the shadows for years before they
8 were allowed to serve openly.

9 26. Even with respect to these service members, the data is fundamentally
10 flawed and presented in a grossly misleading manner. The study period for the
11 data was for the 22-month period from October 1, 2015 to July 26, 2017. But
12 Secretary Carter’s Open Service Directive was not issued until June 30, 2016, and
13 the military did not issue force-wide treatment protocols for gender dysphoria until
14 October 1, 2016. As a result, for 12 out of the 22 months in the study, the service
15 members were, with few exceptions, not serving openly and not receiving DOD-
16 sanctioned treatments for gender dysphoria.

17 27. If the purpose of the study is to draw conclusions about the health of
18 transgender service members under the Open Service policy, it is fundamentally
19 illegitimate to include data from before that policy went into effect and before
20 those service members were allowed to receive health care under DOD guidelines
21 to treat their gender dysphoria.

22 28. For example, the Implementation Report cites data from the study for
23 the proposition that transgender service members had an average of 28.1 mental
24 health encounters over a 22-month period. *See* Exhibit B, Implementation Report
25 at 24; Exhibit H, USDOE 2633-2664 at 8. But it is impossible to determine
26 whether these mental health encounters occurred before or after the Open Service
27 policy went into effect. If the utilization rate dropped once service members
28

1 started receiving care for gender dysphoria, then the data would actually support
2 the efficacy of the Open Service policy.

3 29. The Implementation Report also ignores the critical fact that service
4 members were required to meet with mental health providers numerous times to
5 document their gender dysphoria as a precondition for receiving health care for
6 gender dysphoria, and for continued access to cross-sex hormones. It is unknown
7 how many of these visits were mandated/required, as opposed to visits voluntarily
8 requested by service members for mental health care. As a result, without more
9 specific data, there is no reason to conclude that mental health visits by transgender
10 service members who are initiating transition-related care are a sign of co-morbid
11 mental health conditions. The report is quite misleading in this regard, as it implies
12 that all mental health visits by transgender service members were initiated for the
13 treatment of mental illnesses, when this is far from the truth.

14 30. Similarly, the Implementation Report cites data from the study for the
15 proposition that service members with gender dysphoria are “eight times more
16 likely to attempt suicide than Service members as a whole.” Exhibit B,
17 Implementation Report at 12. In fact, the underlying data refer to “suicidal
18 ideation,” not actual suicide attempts. Exhibit H, USDOE 2633-2664 at 9.
19 Moreover, with respect to suicidal ideation, the data does not reveal whether the
20 suicidal ideation was reported before or after the service member was allowed to
21 serve openly and receive treatment. Given the fundamental flaws with the study
22 methodology and the low number of observed events, the data presented on this,
23 and other, mental health questions are not interpretable in any meaningful way.

24 31. In short, transgender individuals should be screened and evaluated for
25 mental health conditions the same way every other person is screened and
26 evaluated. There is no medical basis to using a transgender individual’s history of
27 gender dysphoria as a proxy for other mental health conditions that they do not
28 have.

1 **TRANSGENDER SERVICE MEMBERS WHO HAVE TRANSITIONED**
2 **ARE PHYSICALLY FIT TO ENLIST AND DEPLOY**

3 32. As I explained in my previous declaration, the argument that cross-sex
4 hormone treatment should be a bar to service for transgender individuals is not
5 supported by medical science or current military medical protocols. Experts in the
6 endocrine treatment of transgender people have previously advised military
7 medical providers that cross-sex hormone treatments can be accomplished without
8 difficulty, both before accession and after service has begun. *See* WPATH
9 Timeline Guide for United States Armed Service Members Going Through
10 Transgender Hormonal or Surgical Transition (Jan. 2017),
11 <https://www.wpath.org/newsroom/policies> (attached as Exhibit I).

12 33. The military allows people with a history other medical conditions to
13 enlist even when the condition is currently being managed by medication.
14 Individuals with abnormal menstruation, dysmenorrhea, and endometriosis may
15 enlist if their conditions are adequately managed through hormone medication.
16 *See* DODI 6130.03, Enclosure 4 §§ 14(a), (d), (e).² Individuals with Gastro-
17 Esophageal Reflux Disease or high cholesterol may enlist if they are taking
18 medication with no relevant side effects. *Id.* §§ 13(a), 25(i).

19 34. The Implementation Report asserts that transgender service members
20 receiving cross-sex hormone therapy would risk having their treatment disrupted if
21 they are deployed. But the same concerns about interruptions apply to every
22 service member who is deployed while taking medication. These concerns have
23 not been a barrier to deployment for service members who require hormones for
24 other medical conditions or who require medications for other mental health
25 conditions that allow for deployment.

26 _____
27 ² As noted previously noted, DOD issued new regulations on March 30, 2018,
28 which will go into effect on May 6, 2018. *See supra* n.1. The U.S. Military
Entrance Processing Command has not yet issued guidance applying the new
regulations.

1 35. Military policy also allows service members to take a range of
2 medications, including hormones, while deployed in combat settings. Access to
3 medication is predictable, as “[t]he Military Health Service maintains a
4 sophisticated and effective system for distributing prescription medications to
5 deployed service members worldwide.” See M. Joycelyn Elders et al., *Medical*
6 *Aspects of Transgender Military Service*, 41 *Armed Forces & Soc’y* 199, 207
7 (Aug. 2014) (the “Elders Commission Report”).

8 36. Hormone therapy is neither too risky nor too complicated for military
9 medical personnel to administer and monitor. The risks associated with use of
10 cross-sex hormone therapy to treat gender dysphoria are low and not any higher
11 than for the hormones that many non-transgender active duty military personnel
12 currently take. The medications do not have to be refrigerated, and alternatives to
13 injectables are readily available, further simplifying treatment plans. Clinical
14 monitoring for risks and effects is not complicated and, with training and/or access
15 to consultations, can be performed by a variety of medical personnel in the DOD,
16 just as is the case in the VHA. This is the military services’ current practice in
17 support of the limited medical needs of their transgender troops in CONUS
18 (Continental United States) and in deployment stations worldwide. Guidance on
19 this issue was provided in January 2017 to military medical providers who care for
20 transgender service members and shows that stable, transitioned troops require
21 only yearly laboratory monitoring for cross-sex hormone treatment (which is
22 consistent with the yearly, routine laboratory health screenings that *all* active duty
23 troops receive). See Exhibit I, WPATH Timeline Guide.

24 37. Transgender service members—including service members who
25 receive hormone medication—are just as capable of deploying as service members
26 who are not transgender. DOD rules expressly permit deployment, without need
27 for a waiver, for a number of medical conditions that present a much more
28 significant degree of risk in a harsh environment than simply being transgender.

1 For example, hypertension is not disqualifying if controlled by medication, despite
2 the inherent risks in becoming dehydrated in desert deployment situations. Heart
3 attacks experienced while on active duty or treatment with coronary artery bypass
4 grafts are also not disqualifying, if they occur more than a year preceding
5 deployment. These are very serious, life-threatening medical conditions with a
6 high rate of recurrence, yet these service members with cardiac disease are
7 nonetheless allowed to stay on active duty and deploy under prescribed conditions.

8 38. Under the Department of Defense’s generally applicable policies,
9 service members may deploy with certain psychiatric conditions, if they
10 demonstrate stability under treatment for at least three months. *See* DODI
11 6490.07, Enclosure 3 § h(2); Dep’t of Defense, Clinical Practice Guidance for
12 Deployment-Limiting Mental Disorders and Psychotropic Medications (2013).
13 Army regulations specifically provide that “[a] psychiatric condition controlled by
14 medication should not automatically lead to non-deployment.” *See* AR 40-501 §
15 5-14(8)(a).

16 39. Instead of discussing these medical conditions, the Implementation
17 Report compares cross-sex hormone therapy for gender dysphoria with other
18 medical conditions that are plainly not comparable. For example, the
19 Implementation Report states that “[a]ny DSM-5 psychiatric disorder with residual
20 symptoms or medication side effects, which impair social or occupational
21 performance, require a waiver for the Service member to deploy.” Exhibit B,
22 Implementation Report at 34. As I previously explained, gender dysphoria is a
23 treatable and curable condition. With medically appropriate care, it is possible for
24 transgender service members to resolve the clinically significant gender dysphoria
25 *without* any residual symptoms or impairment. Comparisons made to
26 schizophrenia and bipolar disorder in the Implementation Report are inappropriate,
27 as these two conditions constitute serious mental illnesses for which treatments are
28 often ineffective and for which the notion of “cure” is nonsensical.

1 **SERVICE MEMBERS WHO TRANSITION WHILE IN SERVICE CAN**
2 **MEET THE SAME RETENTION STANDARDS THAT APPLY TO NON-**
3 **TRANSGENDER SERVICE MEMBERS**

4 40. As I explained in my previous report, service members who are
5 diagnosed with gender dysphoria after already enlisting can transition while in
6 service and still meet the same retention standards that apply to non-transgender
7 service members. The military has generally applicable standards for determining
8 whether a service member may continue to serve despite periods of limited non-
9 deployability. If a transgender service member's limited period of non-
10 deployability complies with those generally applicable standards, there is no reason
11 why the service member should be automatically discharged simply because they
12 were receiving surgery for gender dysphoria as opposed to a different medical
13 condition. A determination of non-deployability must be based on the status of the
14 individual and not on arbitrary, non-evidence based determinations. There is some
15 evidence that the latter is occurring, based on the widely disparate between-service
16 data reported on days of limited duty for service members receiving treatment for
17 gender dysphoria as reported by the various services. *See* Exhibit H, USDOE
18 2633-2664 at 17. This DOD data strongly suggests that non-medical factors are
19 playing an outsized role in determination of days spent in other than full-duty
20 capacities for transgender service members on service-level treatment plans.

21 41. Although the Implementation Report states that one commander
22 predicted that transgender service members beginning a course of hormone therapy
23 will be non-deployable for as long as two-and-a-half years, the Implementation
24 Report does not cite any data to support that assertion. Exhibit B, Implementation
25 Report at 33–34. To the contrary, the presentation of the data states that service
26 members initiating hormone therapy were non-deployable for 3–6 months in the
27 Navy and for an average of 5–6 months in the Army and Air Force. Exhibit H,
28 USDOE 2633-2664 at 17. There is no medical basis for the Implementation

1 Reports suggestion that cross-sex hormone therapy could render a transgender
2 service member non-deployable for a full twelve months. Exhibit B,
3 Implementation Report at 23. In fact, expert guidance on this very issue was
4 provided to military medical providers by WPATH in January 2017, as previously
5 noted.

6 42. There is also no basis to presume that surgical care for gender
7 dysphoria will render transgender service members non-deployable for extended
8 periods of time. The recovery time for non-genital surgeries, which are the most
9 common procedures performed, is only 2–8 weeks. Exhibit H, USDOE 2633-2664
10 at 19.

11 43. Moreover, transgender service members can schedule medical
12 procedures to ensure that they do not interfere with deployment. This approach is
13 routinely done for other medically necessary procedures, such as orthopedic
14 surgeries that allow for flexibility in the timing of the surgery. As the
15 Implementation Report acknowledges, “[t]his conclusion was echoed by some
16 experts in endocrinology who found no harm in stopping or adjusting hormone
17 therapy treatment to accommodate deployment during the first year of hormone
18 use.” Exhibit B, Implementation Report at 34.


19 44. To be sure, there may be some transgender service members whose
20 individualized medical needs make it impossible to transition while satisfying the
21 military’s generally applicable standards for deployment and retention. But those
22 determinations can and should be made on a case-by-case basis depending on the
23 individual’s fitness to serve, as is done with other treatable conditions. There is no
24 medical basis to conclude that all, or even most, service members undergoing
25 treatment for gender dysphoria are categorically unfit to serve.

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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 25th day of April, 2018



George R. Brown, M.D.